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Notes:
Addressing the Value Gap in the
Age of Digital Music Streaming
ABSTRACT

This Note analyzes a global music industry problem known as
the value gap. The value gap represents the disparity between
the value that music-streamingplatforms extract from musical
content and the revenue generated by those who create and
invest in the creation of such content. The internationalrise in
digital music streaming has contributed greatly to the
expansion of the value gap. This is largely because outdated
laws like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the United
States and other similar statutes around the globe contain safe
harborprovisions that shield certain music-streaming services
from copyright-infringement liability. Safe harbor protection
provides these services with a powerful bargainingchip during
licensing negotiations with music copyright holders. After
exploring the origins of the value gap, this Note advocates for a
two-step legislative solution to the problem. The first step
involves revising the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty in a manner that obligates member
states to comply by narrowingthe scope of domestic safe harbor
provisions. The second step recommends an alteration to the
current music-licensing framework in an effort to ensure
adequate remunerationfor music rightsholders.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"Dear Congress: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is broken
and no longer works for creators."' This is the opening of a June 2016
2
petition to reform the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
Over 170 artists, including music superstars such as Sir Paul
McCartney, Taylor Swift, Kings of Leon, and Jack White, signed the
petition asserting that the DMCA is outdated and in dire need of
legislative reform.3 Other signers of the petition included legacy
artists such as Billy Joel, Sting, U2, and individual members of the
Eagles. 4 In an infamous June 13, 2016 interview with Billboard
Magazine, Trent Reznor of the band Nine Inch Nails expressed
frustration with the DMCA by calling out YouTube, claiming that the
video sharing platform was "built on the backs of free, stolen
5
content."
The DMCA was enacted on October 28, 1998.6 Title II of the Act
limits copyright-infringement liability of online service providers that
Alex Young, 180 musicians sign petition asking congress to end YouTube's
1.
(June 20, 2016, 2:34 PM),
copyright loopholes, CONSEQUENCE OF SOUND
https://consequenceofsound.net/2016/06/180-musicians-sign-petition-asking-congressto-end-youtubes-copyright-loopholes/ [https://perma.cc/3NYE-ZDBY] (archived Jan. 19,
2019).
Id.
2.
Id.
3.
Daniel Kreps, Jack White, Pearl Jam, U2, Trent Reznor Sign DMCA
4.
Petition, ROLLING STONE (June 22, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/Jack6 62 2
[https://perma.cc/Z6X4white-pearl-jam-u2-trent-reznor-sign-dmca-petition-201 0
FBWK] (archived Jan. 19, 2019).
Shirley Halperin, Apple's Brain Trust-ovine, Reznor, Cue and Kondrk-on
5.
Streaming's New World Order and Why 'We All Should Be' Worried, BILLBOARD (June
http://www.billboard.comlarticles/news/7401446/apple-brain-trust2016),
14,
(archived
[https://perma.cc/SF88-CYY8]
streaming-new-world-order-youtube-wwdc
Jan. 19, 2019).
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF
6.
http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf
(1998),
1
SUMMARY
1998:
[https://perma.cc/TVL2-6Y8M] (archived Feb. 17, 2019) [hereinafter DMCA Summary]
(discussing the DMCA legislative process).
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offer statutorily prescribed services. 7 More specifically, the DMCA
added § 512 to the U.S. Copyright Act (Copyright Act), which
implements liability-shielding safe harbors for online service
providers that store information posted by users.8 Although the
DMCA was originally enacted in 1998, it has caused recent uproar
among musicians, songwriters, and other music copyright holders.9
What explains this sudden outcry? The petition to amend the DMCA
explains that the "law was written and passed in an era that is
technologically out-of-date compared to the era in which we live."1 0
The petition goes on to explain that "[t]he tech companies who benefit
from the DMCA today were not the intended protectorate when it was
signed into law nearly two decades ago."" Those opposed to the law
contend that technology titans such as Google and its subsidiary,
YouTube, are exploiting the DMCA's safe harbor provisions to
establish unfair negotiating leverage in music-licensing deals.12 This
leverage allows streaming services that qualify for safe harbor
protection to generate immense profits at the expense of content
creators and other copyright owners.1 3
The safe harbor provisions in the DMCA and similar laws in
various countries around the world have had a detrimental impact on
the global music industry. 14 Due to the global rise in digital music
streaming, issues surrounding the remuneration of artists are not
confined to US borders.1 5 According to the International Federation
for the Phonographic Industry's (IFPI) 2017 Global Music Report
(2017 Global Music Report), digital music streaming is "the most.
prevalent and significant format in the modern music industry." 16 In
7.
Id.
8.
Id. at 8.
9.
See Kreps, supra note 4.
10.
Young, supranote 1.
11.
Id.
12.
See Micah Singleton & Ben Popper, The music industry cranks up the
volume in its fight against YouTube, THE VERGE (June 3, 2016, 12:48 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/20l6/6/3/11852146/music-industry-fighting-youtube-dmea
[https://perma.cc/Q9EZ-22V5] (archived Jan. 19, 2019) (explaining that YouTube
maintains leverage in deal negotiations because labels and other copyright owners
must choose between getting some revenue way below market value or getting no
revenue and spending time policing the site for infringing content).
13.
ANNUAL

INT'L FED'N FOR THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., GLOBAL Music REPORT 2017:
STATE
OF
THE
INDUSTRY
25
(2017),

http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ5B-BL5K] (archived
Jan. 19, 2019) [hereinafter 2017 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT].
14.
See id.; Gregor Pryor et al., European Copyright Reform-Safe Harbourand
the
Value
Gap
(June
6,
2017),
REED
SMITH
CLIENT
ALERTS
https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/201 7/06/european-copyright-reform-safeharbour-and-the-value-gap [https://perma.cclQL22-JQ7V] (archived Jan. 19, 2018).
15.
See 2017 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 16 (discussing the
widespread growth of streaming in all major markets and even some developing
territories).
16.
REPORT

Id.; see also INT'L FED'N FOR THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS.,
2018:
ANNUAL
STATE
OF
THE
INDUSTRY

GLOBAL MUSIC
10
(2018),
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short, the shift to music streaming has made adequate remuneration
a primary concern for industry stakeholders, including songwriters,
17
musicians, publishing companies, and record labels.
18
The remuneration problem is often referred to as the value gap.
The IFPI's 2018 Global Music Report (2018 Global Music Report)
explains that the value gap "describes the growing mismatch between
the value that user upload services, such as YouTube, extract from
music and the revenue returned to the music community-those who
are creating and investing in music."19 The 2017 Global Music Report
considers the value gap to be "the biggest threat to the future
20
sustainability of the music industry." The value gap poses such a
large threat because without adequate compensation, songwriters
and musicians are discouraged from investing in the creation of new
music.2 1

Further, the value gap dissuades record companies from

22
The creation of new
investing in the development of new artists.
to the longessential
are
artists
music and the development of new
safe harbor
the
Ultimately,
term sustainability of the music industry.
of the
success
future
the
provisions in laws like the DMCA place
23
global music industry in jeopardy.
The rapid expansion of the value gap can be largely attributed to
the popularity of music streaming on YouTube and similar user
upload services. 24 The widespread popularity of streaming is
exemplified by hip hop artist Chance the Rapper's 2016 album,
Coloring Book, which could not be purchased in stores and was only
25
Despite this
available through various streaming services.
Rapper three
the
unconventional release, the album earned Chance

http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2018.pdf [https:/perma.cclSGZ3-PLHM] (archived
Jan. 19, 2019) [hereinafter 2018 GLOBAL MusIc REPORT] (noting that digital revenues
now account for 54 percent of the global recorded music market).
See 2018 GLOBAL MusIc REPORT, supra note 16, at 26.
17.
2017 GLOBAL MusIc REPORT, supra note 13, at 25.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.; see also 2018 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 16, at 27 (describing
20.
the value gap as-the "biggest policy challenge facing the music industry").
2017 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 25; see also 2018 GLOBAL
21.
MUSIC REPORT, supra note 16, at 27.

2017 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 25; see also 2018 GLOBAL
22.
MUSIC REPORT, supra note 16, at 26.
23.

2017 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 25.

.

See id. (explaining that the value gap arose as a result of the "mismatch
24.
between the value that user upload services, such as YouTube, extract from the music
and the revenue returned to the music community"); see also 2018 GLOBAL MUSIC
REPORT, supra note 16, at 26 ("Inconsistent applications of online liability laws have
emboldened certain digital platforms to claim they are not liable . . . services such as
YouTube, which have developed into sophisticated on-demand music platforms, use
this as a shield to avoid licensing music like other digital services do . .
25.

2017 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 25.

2019]

VALUE GAP IN THE AGE OFDIGITAL STREAMING

515

Grammy awards-an achievement symbolizing the new norm for
music consumption. 26
Some of the major players in the streaming-services industry
include Spotify, Apple Music, Tidal, iHeartRadio, Amazon, and
Deezer.27 Each of these companies offers a similar service, charges a
similar subscription fee, and provides access to virtually the same
catalog of music. 2 8 In contrast to subscription-based models, pure ad-

supported platforms like YouTube generate all revenue through
advertisements. 29 Notably, the IFPI's 2018 Music Consumer Insight
Report reveals that 47 percent of time spent listening to on-demand
music is on YouTube.3 0
In addition to YouTube's pure ad-supported platform, the
company introduced a subscription-based platform called YouTube
Music Premium on May 17, 2018.31 Like other subscription-based
services such as Spotify and Apple Music, YouTube Music Premium
allows users to pay a subscription fee to avoid having to listen to
advertisements. 32
On January 23, 2018, YouTube implemented Official Artist
Channels.3 3 These channels are designed to make it easier for
26.
See id.; see also Lyndsey Havens, Chance the Rapper's 'Coloring Book' Is
First Streaming-Only Album To Win a Grammy, BILLBOARD (Feb. 13, 2017),
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/grammys/7686341/chance-the-rapper-coloringbook-first-streaming-only-album-grammy [https://perma.cc/93YP-67R3] (archived Jan.
19, 2019).
27.
Randall Roberts, Distinguishing between music streaming options, TIMES
FREE PRESS (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.timesfreepress.com/news/life/entertainment/
story/2017/feb/12/digital-deluge-distinguishing-between-music-s/412090/
[https://perma.cc/RJ6W-B7T6] (archived Feb. 4, 2019).
28.
See id.
29.
See Andre Paine, 'Nowhere Near': RLAA Responds to Lyor Cohen's Claim on
YouTube
Streaming Rate, MUSIC WEEK (Aug.
20,
2017,
8:17
PM),
https://www.musicweek.com/digital/read/nowhere-near-riaa-responds-to-1yor-cohen-sclaim-on-youtube-streaming-rate/069516 [https://perma.cc/C6DP-79VN] (archived Jan.
19, 2019).
30.

See INT'L FED'N FOR THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., MUSIC CONSUMER INSIGHT

REPORT 2018 at 13 (2018), https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Music-Consumer-InsightReport-2018.pdf [hereinafter MUSIC CONSUMER INSIGHT REPORT]; see also 2018 GLOBAL
MUSIC REPORT, supra note 16, at 27. The Music Consumer Insight Report further
noted that video streaming makes up 52 percent of on-demand music streaming time,
while only 28 percent is on paid audio streaming. This report also estimates that the
annual revenue generated per user on YouTube was less than $1, while the annual
revenue generated per user on Spotify was approximately $20. See MUSIC CONSUMER
INSIGHT REPORT, supra.

31.
See Josh Katzowitz, What Happened to YouTube Red?!, THE DAILY DOT
(Mar. 26, 2018, 9:38 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/upstreamlyoutube-red-vs-youtubepremium/ [https://perma.cc/7BJL-AHLH] (archived Mar. 9, 2019) (explaining that
Google launched YouTube Music Premium as an "overhaul and rebranding" of its
October 2015 subscription-based platform called YouTube Red).
32.
Id.
33.
Colin Stutz, YouTube Unveils Plans to Benefit Artists and Songwriters:
Consolidating Content, Implementing ID System, BILLBOARD (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://www.biilboard.com/articlesfbusiness/8095869/youtube-official-channels-isni-idsystem-artist-songwriters [https://perma.cc/9Q3F-97K3] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
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listeners to find music by their favorite bands and artists in one
consolidated location. 34 The change is specifically tailored for users
who "treat YouTube like a jukebox."3 5 Of course, this is troubling for
artists and musicians concerned with the value gap because it makes
it even easier for consumers to operate YouTube like a free digital
interactive streaming service. 36
One final aspect of YouTube's model relevant to the value gap
analysis is its video recommendation system.3 7 As the name suggests,
the system's goal is to "provide personalized high quality video
recommendations to its users."38 The system first uses data-mining
techniques to identify "a set of related videos that a user is likely to
watch after viewing a seed video."3 9 Once the system identifies the set
of related videos, or "recommendation candidates," it ranks them
based on video quality, the user's unique preferences, and
diversification (a method that offers a variety of videos based on a
user's range of viewing interests). 40 In January 2018, YouTube's
Chief Product Officer Neal Mohan revealed that the company's
recommendation system drives more than 70 percent of the overall
viewing hours on the site.4 1 This statistic demonstrates the powerful
42
influence YouTube's video recommendation system has on its users.
Despite the fact that music streaming is largely responsible for
the emergence of the value gap, it nonetheless has some positive
attributes. For instance, streaming has allowed music to break
geographic borders by opening up music markets in regions that did
not previously have them.43 The Recording Industry Association of
America's (RIAA) 2017 midyear report expressed optimism about the
future of streaming, pointing to the fact that streaming made up 62

Id.
34.
Jon Fingas, YouTube's unified artist channels clean up its music mess,
35.
ENGADGET (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/01/23/youtube-officialartist-channels/ [https://perma.cc/G8JT-XEXM] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
See Stutz, supra note 33.
36.
How Does the YouTube Recommendation System Work?, TROUVUS (Jan. 12,
37.
http://trouvus.comlhow-does-the-youtube-recommendation-system-work/
2015),
[https://perma.cc/7655-ZNZA] (archived Jan. 20, 2019) [hereinafter TRoUVUsI.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Joan E. Solsman, YouTube's Al is the puppet master over most of what you
41.
watch, CNET (Jan. 10, 2018, 10:05 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/youtube-ces-2018neal-mohan/ [https://perma.ccl57J4-LYUP] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
See id.; see also TROUVUS, supra note 37 (noting that over a 21-day period in
42.
2015, the click through rate for recommended videos performed at 207 percent of the
average click through rate).
See 2017 Global Music Report, supra note 13, at 21 (quoting Beggar Group
43.
Chairman Martin Mills, who points out that streaming has opened up markets in
Russia, Brazil, and Mexico).
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percent of total US music-industry revenues. 44 According to an earlier
RIAA report, this uptick in US revenue from streaming represented a
29 percent increase from the revenue generated in 2015.45 In
addition, streaming revenues have increased in many other regions,
including Europe, Asia, and Latin America. 4 6
Despite the increasing profitability of streaming overall, some
streaming services pay smaller licensing fees than others.4 7 In the
RIAA's 2017 midyear report, former Chairman and CEO Cary
Sherman pointed out that "not all streaming services are equal." 48
Sherman explained that "[t]o the fan, there is often little difference
between the multitudes of services available, yet the payouts to
creators are very different and vastly impacted by outdated or abused
laws and regulations." 49 While subscription-based services like
Spotify legally license music, other ad-supported streaming services
such as YouTube argue that they are not required to obtain a license
to host user uploaded content.50 According to the 2018 Global Music
Report, Spotify paid record companies an estimated $20 per user,
while YouTube paid less than $1 per user in 2017.51 The British.
Phonographic Industry (BPI) also reported that in 2015, the revenue
generated from pure ad-supported platforms (the category that
includes YouTube) represented 4 percent of total recording-industry
revenues-an amount less than the revenue generated by vinyl sales
during that year. 52 According to an RIAA study, a person would have
to watch fifty-eight hours of music videos on YouTube before the
content creator would receive a single dollar of revenue. 5 3 Despite
pressure from the RIAA, the BPI, the IFPI, and other global musicindustry forces, platforms like YouTube continue to shield themselves
from copyright liability by hiding behind safe harbor provisions
originally enacted to protect relatively small start-up companies
operating as passive intermediaries for their users. 5 4
Part II of this Note discusses current safe harbor provisions in
copyright laws of several countries that were originally implemented
to protect start-up digital media sites from crippling copyright
44.
Cary Sherman, The State of Music Mid-Way Through 2017, MEDIUM (Sept.
20,
2017),
https://medium.com/@RIAAlthe-state-of-music-mid-way-through-20177e90cad298f9 [https://perma.ccl7DKE-DT8J] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
45.
See id.
46.
Id.; see 2018 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 16, at 30.
47.
See Sherman, supra note 44.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.

2017 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 13.

51.
2018 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 16, at 27.
52.
Paine, supra note 29.
53.
Sherman, supra note 44.
54.
See 2017 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 26 (citing June 2016
letter asking the European Commission to address the value gap through legislation
because the safe harbor provisions are being misapplied to protect large corporations
rather than "nascent digital start-ups").
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liability. Part III provides an overview of the relevant international
intellectual property instruments designed to harmonize copyright
laws across the globe and establish minimum standards of copyright
protection. Part IV discusses the current music-licensing system
imposed on streaming services and highlights some of this
framework's deficiencies. After detailing the various contributing
causes to the rise of the value gap, Part V discusses possible solutions
to the problem, including some currently under consideration. Part VI
proposes a two-step legislative effort designed to diminish the value
gap. Step one involves a revision to the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty to compel the treaty's
signatories to comply by amending domestic safe harbor statutes in a
manner that eliminates protection for streaming services that control,
organize, promote, and monetize unlicensed copyrighted music. The
second step of the proposed solution recommends relatively minor
changes to the current music-licensing framework aimed at better
serving the interests of key stakeholders engaged in music-licensing
transactions.

II. THE VALUE GAP
The value gap is caused by inconsistent applications of online
liability laws that provide some streaming services with safe harbor
55
protection from copyright infringement liability, but not others.
Part II explores these laws in various countries and discusses how
they have contributed to the expansion of the value gap.
A. The Value Gap in the United States
The DMCA's safe harbor provisions eliminate copyright liability
"for the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a
system or network controlled or operated by or for the service
56
provider" if three requirements are met.
The first requirement is that the service provider cannot have
57
actual knowledge of specific infringing content on its site. Courts
have found actual knowledge of infringing content when a service
provider has taken affirmative steps to "willfully blind" itself of the
infringing material.5 8 In addition, a service provider cannot rely on
safe harbor protection if facts or circumstances exist that make the

2018 GLOBAL Music REPORT, supra note 16, at 26.
55.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)-(C)
56.
[hereinafter DMCA].
Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
57.
See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2012).
58.

(2010)
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infringing activity apparent.5 9 In Viacom Int'l., Inc. v. YouTube, the
Second Circuit equated this so-called red flag knowledge to
constructive knowledge.60 It clarified that the difference between red
flag knowledge and actual knowledge is not "between specific and
generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an
objective standard." 61 Thus, a service provider has red flag knowledge
in circumstances where it is subjectively aware of facts that would
have made the infringement objectively obvious to a reasonable
person. 62 Finally, if the service provider obtains actual or constructive
knowledge of infringement, it may nonetheless avoid liability as long
as it "acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material." 6 3
The second requirement is that a service provider must not
"receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and
ability to control such activity." 64 In Viacom, the Second Circuit
concluded that the right to control "requires something more than the
ability to remove or block access to materials posted on a service
provider's website." 65 The court ultimately determined that YouTube
did not exert a degree of control over its content sufficient to lose its
entitlement to safe harbor protection. 66 However, the statute's control
requirement remains ambiguous because the Viacom court failed to
explain what type of activity constitutes "something more." 67
The Second Circuit's ruling in Viacom did not provide a clear
interpretation of the word "control" as contemplated by § 512(c)(1)(B)
of the DMCA. However, it suggested that inducement of copyright
infringement, like that which occurred in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, may be one example of conduct that exceeds
the minimal level of control required for protection under the
DMCA. 68 In Grokster, the Supreme Court unanimously held that "one
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of

59.
DMCA § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
60.
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 58.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
DMCA § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
64.
Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
65.
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC,
821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
66.
Id.
67.
See Elliott Alderman, Reading the Tea Leaves: ISP Obligations After the
Second Circuit's Viacom v. YouTube Decision (2012), THE CONTENT LAWYER (Dec. 12,
2012), https://www.thecontentlawyer.com/reading-the-tea-leaves-isp-obligations-afterthe-second-circuits-viacom-v-youtube-decision-2012/
[https://perma.cc/5LMW-4ZHK]
(archived Jan. 24, 2019).
68.
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38.
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infringement by third parties."6 9 The Grokster defendants distributed
software products that allowed users to share files through peer-topeer networks.7 0 Discovery revealed that 90 percent of the files made
available for download on the defendants' platforms were infringing
works.7 1 Even though the infringing content was posted by
consumers, the Court held that the defendants were not "merely
72
passive recipients of information about infringing use." Instead, the
record showed that the defendants had the objective of serving as a
platform for the distribution of unlicensed copyrighted works and, in
73
fact, personally encouraged the infringing activity.
A year after Viacom, the Ninth Circuit grappled with the
DMCA's control provision in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Fung. There,
the court held that the defendant's peer-to-peer file sharing websites
were ineligible for safe harbor protection because they failed to meet
74
the requirements contained in § 512(c)(1)(B) of the DMCA. The
defendant in Fung both received a financial benefit from infringing
75
content and had the right and ability to control it. The websites
through advertisements. 76 This revenue
generated revenue
constituted a financial benefit directly related to the infringing
activity because "the revenue stream [was] predicated on the broad
availability

of

infringing

materials

.

.

.

thereby

attracting

77

advertisers." The court also found it relevant that an estimated 9096 percent of the content on the websites was either "confirmed or
78
highly likely copyright infringing."
The court went on to determine that the service provider had the
right and ability to control the infringing content because the
provider did more than merely identify and terminate access to the
content.7 9 In addition to this activity, the defendant "organized
torrent files on his sites using a program that matches file names and
content with specific search terms describing material likely to be
infringing."8 0 Further, the defendant offered personal assistance to
8
users seeking content on the site that was likely to be infringing. 1
The court ultimately held that the defendant was entirely barred

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
Id.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 924.
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1044 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 1045.
Id.
Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1046.
Id.
Id.
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from relying on the safe harbor protections as a matter of law because
he failed to meet the § 512(c)(1)(B) requirements. 82
Finally, under the DMCA's third requirement for safe harbor
protection, a service provider must respond expeditiously in taking
down infringing content.8 3 However, the DMCA does not require
service providers to affirmatively monitor their sites for infringing
activity. 84 Instead, the statute places the duty to police infringement
on copyright owners.85 Given this duty, many copyright owners work
hard to alert providers of infringing uses of their content. 86 In the
month of March 2016 alone, YouTube received over 75 million DMCA
"takedown requests."8 7 These formal takedown requests must adhere
to the strict guidelines set forth within the statute, making the
removal of infringing content both costly and time consuming for
copyright owners.8 8 Under the notice and takedown procedure set
forth in § 512(c)(3), copyright owners must, under penalty of perjury,
submit a notification to the service provider, or its agent, that
contains a list of statutory elements.89 These elements include: the
copyright owner's signature, identification of the work claimed to be
infringed, identification of the material that is claimed to be
infringing and information sufficient for the provider to locate the
material, contact information of the complaining party, a statement
that the copyright owner has in good faith filed the complaint, and a
statement that the information is accurate.9 0
The U.S. Copyright Office's summary of the DMCA explains that
"[flailure to comply substantially with the statutory requirements
means that the notification will not be considered in determining the
requisite level of knowledge by the service provider." 9 ' Even if the
request satisfies the demanding statutory requirements and the
infringing material is taken down, the alleged infringer has the right
to respond by filing a counter notification. 92 In response to a counter
notification, the copyright owner must seek a court order against the
82.
Id.
83.
DMCA § 512(c)(1)(C).
84.
Id. § 512(m)(1).
85.
See Alderman, supra note 67 (explaining that under the DMCA, a service
provider has no duty to take down content until it receives an "adequately detailed
take-down notice" from the copyright holder).
86.
See Andy, RIAA CEO: Piracy Notices Are Costly and Increasingly Pointless,
TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 24, 2014), https://torrentfreak.com/riaa-ceo-piracy-notices-arecostly-increasingly-pointless-150924/ [https://perma.cc/L8SP-MCNL] (archived Jan. 24,
2019).
87.
Chris Welch, Google received over 75 million copyright takedown requests in
February, THE VERGE (Mar. 7, 2016, 11:02 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/7/
11172516/google-takedown-requests-75-million
[https://perma.cclDT5N-DAJS]
(archived Jan. 24, 2019).
88.
See DMCA § 512(c)(3).
89.
DMCA Summary, supra note 6, at 12.
90.
DMCA § 512(c)(3).
91.
DMCA Summary, supra note 6, at 12.
92.
Id.
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alleged infringer.9 3 If the copyright owner fails to do so, the service
provider is required put the material back on the platform within 1094
14 business days following the receipt of the counter notification.
Worse still, the alleged infringer may also respond to a takedown
request by simply reuploading the content after the site takes it
down.9 5 This revolving door of infringement creates a Sisyphean task
for parties seeking to enforce their copyrights.
B. The Value Gap in Europe
The European Commission (EC) is leading the charge to address
the value gap through recent legislation, and the effort has garnered
support from a number of prominent European music industry
organizations. 9 6 Article 13 of the EC's proposed Digital Single Market
Directive (DSM Directive) requires member states to hold liable peerupload service providers for hosting unlicensed content-"effectively
97
ending safe harbor immunity in Europe," with a few exceptions. If
passed, this legislation will require hosting service providers to obtain
licenses for all music they distribute.98 Under Article 13, user upload
sites like Facebook and YouTube will be required to "proactively work
99
with rightsholders to stop users uploading copyrighted content."
To understand the EC's approach in drafting the DSM Directive,
it is necessary to explain the relevant legal backdrop. On June 8,
2000, the EC responded to the DMCA by passing the E-Commerce
Directive.1 0 0 Like the DMCA, the E-Commerce Directive was
designed to address the issue of Information Society Service
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
See Peter Kafka, Here's why the music labels are furious at YouTube. Again.,
95.
RECODE (Apr. 11, 2016, 4:00 AM), https://www.recode.net/2016/4/11/11586030/youtube(archived Jan. 24,
google-dmca-riaa-cary-sherman [https://perma.cc/SG9G-4VDT]
2019). In an interview, Mr. Kafka asked Cary Sherman, former CEO of the RIAA, what
single biggest change Sherman would like to see in the DMCA. His response was to
change "notice and take down" to "notice and stay down." He explained that "[t]hey will
not just take down all 100 copies [of infringing content]. They'll take down only the one
file that we've identified. We have to find every one of them, and notice them, and then
they're taken down, and then immediately put right back up." Id.
See 2017 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 27; see also 2018 GLOBAL
96.
MusIc REPORT, supra note 16, at 29.

97.
Richard Smirke, European Union Agrees on Copyright Directive Text,
2019),
(Feb.
13,
Pushing Legislation Towards Final Vote, BILLBOARD
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8498315/european-union-approves-deal(archived Mar.
over-controversial-copyright-directive [https://perma.cclN7Q8-VYMJ
14, 2019); see also 2017 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 27.
98.
See id.
James Vincent, EU approves controversial Copyright Directive, including
99.
internet 'link tax' and 'upload filter', THE VERGE (Sept. 12, 2018, 7:12 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/12/17849868/eu-internet-copyright-reform-article-1 113-approved [https://perma.cc/SAH5-RQZ3] (archived Jan. 26, 2019).
100. See Pryor, supra note 14.
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Providers (ISSPs) "in circumstances where active and exhaustive
monitoring by such providers of their services for copyright-infringing
material was a practical impossibility." 101 Examples of ISSPs include
web shops, search engines, and video sharing sites.1 02 Like the
DMCA, the E-Commerce Directive places no general obligation on
ISSPs to monitor their sites. 0 3 Further, the E-Commerce Directive
provides a safe harbor for hosting services if certain conditions are
met.1 04 The portion of the E-Commerce Directive relevant to the
liability of online hosting platforms mirrors the DMCA's safe harbor
provisions. 0 5 Under the E-Commerce Directive, a hosting service
provider may not rely on safe harbor protections if it has actual
knowledge of the infringing activity.1 0 6 In addition, the service
provider is not protected if it is "aware of facts or circumstances on
the basis of which a diligent economic operator should have identified
the illegality in question."10 7 Service providers are also required to
remove infringing information once subjective knowledge of
infringing content is obtained. 0 8 Finally, the safe harbors in the ECommerce Directive do not apply if the recipient is acting under the
authority or control of the ISSPs. 0 9
If passed, Article 13 of the DSM Directive will apply to all ISSPs
that store and provide the public with access to large amounts of
works uploaded by their users.1 10 More specifically, the DSM
Directive will require that such providers take additional measures to
ensure that copyright holders receive proper remuneration for
content posted and accessed on the sites."' For instance, the DSM
Directive would require ISSPs falling within this description to use
content-recognition technologies and to provide copyright holders
with reports when the technologies present evidence of infringing
content.112
On February 13, 2019, representatives from the three branches
of the European Government-the EC, the Parliament, and the
Council of the European Union-agreed on a definitive final text of
the DSM Directive, which includes the controversial Article 13.11
101.

Id.

102.

DLA PIPER, Eu STUDY ON THE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A SINGLE MARKET FOR

THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 10 (2009).
103. Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular
Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, art. 15, 2000 O.J. (L 178).
104. Council Directive 2000/31, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC).
105. Id.; Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (2010).
106. Id.
107. Case C-324/09, L'Or6al SA v. eBay Int'l AG, 2011 E.C.R. 111-120 (citing
Council Directive 2000/31, art. 14).
108. Council Directive 2000/31, art. 14.
109. Id.
110. Pryor, supra note 14.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Smirke, supra note 97.
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The members of the European Parliament are expected to vote on this
finalized text in late March or early April.11 4 Prior to this vote,
rightsholders groups, publishers, record labels, Google, and a variety
of other stakeholders will scrutinize the text of Article 13 and "any
exceptions it makes around platform liability and for start-up digital
services."1 15 Critics contend that Article 13 will "create an incredible
burden for small platforms" because it would require them to scan all
1 16
If the DSM Directive
uploaded data for copyright infringement.
ultimately passes the final vote, individual EU member states will be
responsible for implementing it.' 17 Each state's implementation of the
1 18
statute could vary based on diverging interpretations of the text.
C. The Value Gap in Asia: Focus on China
Many Asian countries have not yet implemented effective notice
and takedown provisions like those in the United States and in
Europe." 9 The countries that do not have these types of laws in place
require copyright owners to challenge infringement on user upload
platforms through the judicial system.1 20 Still, some Asian countries
have implemented notice and takedown procedures through adoption
of DMCA-like laws. 121 These countries include China, India, Japan,
Malaysia, Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and
Singapore.1 22 Notice and takedown laws vary from country to country
in Asia, but in large part mirror the requirements contained in § 512
23
For instance, South Korea's takedown laws contain
of the DMCA.s
identical elements to the DMCA for providing notice of
infringement.1 24 While Hong Kong's statutory framework resembles
the DMCA, its takedown requirements operate on a voluntary basis
and merely serve as guidelines for streaming services and copyright
owners to follow.1

25

The prevalence of piracy in China's online music market has
26
substantially contributed to the rise of the value gap.1 While China
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Vincent, supra note 99.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Lucas S. Michels, Enforcing Online Copyright Protections Abroad: Part II2014),
IP
EXPORTER
(Aug.
25,
and
East
Asia,
THE
South
https://theipexporter.com/2014/08/25/enforcing-online-copyright-protections-abroadpart-ii-south-and-east-asial [https://perma.cc/HV8S-TRY7] (archived Jan. 24, 2019).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See 2017 GLOBAL MusIc REPORT, supra note 13, at 28.
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has implemented a notice and takedown policy, many of its streaming
service providers fail to take down content after receiving legitimate
takedown notices.1 27 Perhaps this reluctance to comply with the
protocol is a remnant of China's long history of music piracy.1 28 Until
recently, piracy made up approximately 90 percent of the country's
online music market. 29
Despite the history of online music piracy in China, the 2017
Global Music Report reflects optimism about the future of the music
industry there. 3 0 In 2016, China experienced a 20.3 percent increase
in recorded music revenue, which was largely spurred by a 30.6
percent rise in legitimate music streaming.' 3 ' This shift toward
legitimate music streaming is likely due to the Chinese government's
recent efforts to crack down on piracy, paired with an overall change
in attitude among consumers
specially young people-related to
the value of creative content.1 32 This attitude change among Chinese
music consumers stems from a newfound desire to financially support
artists and musicians. 3 3
China's recent shift away from piracy and toward legitimate
music-streaming platforms has also been influenced by the services
provided by Tencent Holdings, a massive Chinese internet company
that owns the most popular streaming service in China, QQ Music.1 34
In addition, Tencent owns two other popular streaming services in
China known as Kugou and Kuwo.13 Collectively, these three
streaming sites make up Tencent's Music Entertainment Group,
which boasts over 15 million paying subscribers. 1 36 Tencent has made
significant steps toward diminishing the value gap by entering into
licensing agreements with both Warner Music and Sony Music. 1 3 7

The 2017 Global Music Report suggests that China has potential to
become one of the world's leading music markets as it continues to
accept legitimate music-streaming models.13 8

127. See Michels, supra note 119.
128. See 2017 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 28 (discussing China's
historical association with online music piracy). But see MUSIC CONSUMER INSIGHT
REPORT, supra note 30, at 17 (recognizing that Chinese consumers are currently
"highly engaged with licensed music").
129. 2017 GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 13, at 30.
130. See id. at 28.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 28-29.
133. See id. at 29.
134. See id. at 28.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See id. ("Major and independent labels from all over the world, fired up by a
new sense of possibility and positivity, are playing their part in building a new
industry, founded on streaming and subscription.").
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RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTRUMENTS

WIPO, a specialized agency of the United Nations, was
established by the WIPO Convention in 1967.139 According to the
WIPO Convention, the organization's objective is "(i) to promote the
protection of intellectual property throughout the world through
cooperation among States and, where appropriate, in collaboration
ensure
organization, (ii) to
international
any other
with
140
As of March 2019,
administrative cooperation among the Unions."
WIPO had 191 member states ranging from Australia to
Zimbabwe.141 WIPO operates in conjunction with the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in a manner that allows the two organizations to
42
"'mutually support' each other on intellectual property matters."1
The WTO is responsible for administering the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),
which "provides for minimum standards of intellectual property
protection in relation to copyright" and other forms of intellectual
property.1 4 3 The WTO also administers a dispute-settlement process
that allows members to challenge intellectual property practices and
44
statutes in other member states.1
In contrast to the WTO, WIPO administers the Berne
Convention, an international agreement that "began a process of
gradual harmonization of minimum standards to be enacted in
national copyright laws."1 45 The Berne Convention preceded the
46
TRIPS Agreement and has been revised six times.1 Each of these
revisions occurred before the arrival of personal computers and the
internet.1 4 7 In 1996, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) was adopted,
aimed at updating international copyright law norms in response to
the advent of the digital age.1 4 8 The WCT is an international
agreement that exists independently of both the Berne Convention
and the TRIPS Agreement.1 49 The primary objective of the WCT is to
50
The
update copyright protection "in the face of new technologies."
139. SusY FRANKEL & DANIEL GERVAIS,
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 7 (2016).

ADVANCED

INTRODUCTION

TO

140. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 3,
July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
ORG.,
PROP.
INTELL.
WORLD
States,
Member
See
141.
http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/Z8KHXJ6T] (archived Feb. 4, 2019).
142. FRANKEL & GERVAIS, supra note 139, at 9.
143. Id. at 28.
144. Id. at 11.
145. Id. at 16, 25.
146. See id. at 25.
147. See id. at 28, 78.
148. Id.
149. See generally WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121.
150. FRANKEL & GERVAIS, supra note 139, at 85.
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WCT entered into force on March 6, 2002,151 and as of March 2019, it
had been ratified by a total of one hundred WIPO members. 152 The
WCT obliges each of these members "to adopt, in accordance with its
legal system, the measures necessary to ensure the application of the
Treaty."1 53
Article 8 of the WCT provides a communication right that
protects copyright owners when they "make their works available" on
the internet. 154 According to a WCT-agreed statement in reference to
Article 8, the "mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or
making a communication does not in itself amount to communication
within the meaning of this Treaty." 5 5 This international rule allows
national laws like the DMCA to provide certain qualifying internet
service providers immunity from copyright-infringement liability
through safe harbor provisions. 156
Article 15 of the WCT creates an assembly capable of making
revisions to the treaty.1 57 The assembly consists of one delegate from
each of the contracting parties.15 8 The assembly meets once every two
years upon convocation of the director general of WIPO.15 9 The
assembly also has the ability to call a diplomatic meeting for the
revision of the treaty and is obligated to give the director general of
WIPO instructions for the preparation of such a conference.1 60

IV. US

Music-LICENSING FRAMEWORK

Possible solutions to correcting the value gap may be found by
adjusting existing music-licensing schemes, particularly those
implemented in the United States.161 The US music-licensing system
is relevant on an international level because the primary performance
151. Id.
152. See
WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang-en&treaty-id=16
(last visited
Mar. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6MX6-VWV9] (archived Jan. 15, 2019) (ratifying states
include the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Panama, Colombia,
Chile, Costa Rica, Kazakhstan, Israel, Nigeria, Kenya, China, Japan, and most
recently in 2019, New Zealand and Cabo Verde).
153. Summary of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) (1996), WORLD. INTELL.
PROP.

ORG.,

https://www.wipo.int/treaties/enlip/wet/summary-wct.html

(last visited

Feb. 17, 2019) [https://perma.cc/57U4-P4L4] (archived Jan. 15, 2019) [hereinafter WCT
Summary].
154. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 149, art. 8; FRANKEL & GERVAIS, supra
note 139, at 85.
155. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 149, art. 8 n.7; FRANKEL & GERVAIS,
supra note 139, at 85.
156.

FRANKEL & GERVAIS, supra note 139, at 85.

157.
158.
159.
160.

WIPO Copyright Treaty, supranote 149, art. 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.

161. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE 133
(2015) [hereinafter MusIc MARKETPLACE REPORT].
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rights organizations (PROs) in the United States, the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI),1 6 2 have reciprocal arrangements with
foreign music rights organizations in "nearly every country around
the world where copyright law exists."1

63

When an artist, publisher,

or other copyright owner registers a work with BMI or ASCAP, an
international database allows foreign music rights organizations to
164
Likewise,
identify the work and pay the necessary royalty fee.
SoundExchange, a nonprofit organization responsible for payment
and reporting of royalties for the public performance of sound
recordings, 165 has similar reciprocal collection agreements with
counterpart organizations in countries all over the world. As the
SoundExchange website points out, "[t]hese agreements allow
[SoundExchange] to collect and pay the artist and right holders
royalties when their music is played in those countries."1 6 6 Finally,
the Harry Fox Agency (HFA), the oldest and largest mechanical
rights organization,1 6 7 offers international monitoring of reproduction
and distribution rights through its database and song management
system.168

A. Musical Works Licensing
Under the US music-licensing system, a licensing agreement for
a single song must account for two different types of copyright-the
sound recording and the musical work. 169 Under the Copyright Act,
the copyright holder of a musical work has public performance rights
162. See id. at 20 (identifying ASCAP and BMI, along with the relatively smaller
SESAC and Global Music Rights (GMR) as the only performing rights organizations in
the United States).
ASCAP,
Advantage,
International
ASCAP
163. The
https://www.ascap.comlhelp/internationallintadvantage (last visited Feb. 17, 2019)
[https://perma.cclEWT5-LP9V] (archived Jan. 16, 2019) [hereinafter ASCAP]; see BMI's
Involvement in the InternationalMarketplace, BMI, https://www.bmi.com/international
(last visited Feb. 17, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6VU7-G2QC] (archived Jan. 16, 2019)
[hereinafter BMI] (explaining that the rightsholders represented by BMI "include
individuals from the more than 90 foreign performing rights organizations with which
BMI has reciprocal agreements").
164. See ASCAP, supra note 163; BMI, supra note 163.
165.

See MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 22.

(2018),
SOUNDEXCHANGE
Partners,
International
166. See
[https://perma.ce/5EPLhttps://www.soundexchange.com/aboutlinternational-partners/
BRX5] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
167.

See MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 21.

168. See
International
Monitoring,
HARRY
Fox
AGENCY,
(last visited
https://secure.harryfox.com/public/InternationalMonitoringPublisher.jsp
Feb. 17, 2019) [https://perma.cclR24X-EC4P] (archived Jan. 16, 2019); see also BMI
Member FAQs, BMI, https://www.bmi.com/faq/entry/what is the-difference-between
2019)
17,
Feb.
visited
(last
performing-right-royalties mechanical r
[https://perma.cclRY43-UT77] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
169.

MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 16.
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and mechanical rights."70 Mechanical rights consist of the "right to
make and distribute copies or phonorecords of [a musical] work." 171
A musical work copyright holder (usually a songwriter or music
publisher) almost always affiliates with a PRO such as ASCAP, BMI,
or SESAC to license its performance rights.1 72 Typically, licensees
obtain a blanket license from each of the PROs. 7 3 A blanket license
permits the licensee to perform any of the musical works in the
licensing PRO's catalogue for a flat fee or percentage-of-revenue
rate. 174 Blanket licenses are commonly obtained by bars, concert
venues, restaurants, and other similar public establishments that
perform musical works for patrons. 175
In 1941, the Department of Justice subjected ASCAP and BMI to
government oversight through the implementation of consent decrees
designed to address perceived antitrust concerns. 1 76 Under these
consent decrees, ASCAP and BMI may only license their members'
public performance rights, must grant a license to anyone that
applies, and must accept all performance rightsholders that apply to
be members so long as they satisfy certain minimum requirements.1 7 7
Under § 115 of the Copyright Act, mechanical rights for musical
works are subject to compulsory licensing fees.178 Prior to the October
2018 passage of the Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music
Modernization Act (MMA),' 7 9 streaming services obtained mechanical
licenses for musical works on a song-by-song basis.' 8 0 They obtained
these licenses by serving a notice of intent to each song's copyright
owner and paying a statutorily prescribed royalty fee. 1 8
This cumbersome song-by-song licensing method presented
administrative
challenges
to third-party
mechanical rights
administrators such as HFA.1 8 2 In 2006, these administrative
170. Id. at 17.
171. Id. at 25.
172. See id. at 33.
173. See id. (explaining that blanket licenses are the most common way obtain
the right to publicly perform a musical work, but clarifying that PROs offer other types
of licenses as a result of consent decrees imposed for the purpose of combatting
anticompetitive behavior).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 35; see ASCAP-BMI Consent Decrees, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION
(Aug. 4, 2016), https://futureofmusic.org/article/fact-sheetlascap-bmi-consent-decrees
[https://perma.cc/2FQY-NH5H] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
177. MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 36; see ASCAP-BMI
Consent Decrees, supra note 176.
178.

MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 21.

179. Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE
(2018),
https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/
[https://perma.cc/8HJL-TD3A] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
180.

MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 28.

181. Id.
182. Id.; see Sweeping Music ModernizationAct Signed into Law, LEXOLOGY (Oct.
12, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=80607bd4-b6dO-42bc-8f464b23bl52a4b5 [https://perma.cc/4PDH-SCUC] (archived Jan. 16, 2019) ("Digital music
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challenges motivated Congress to introduce the Section 115 Reform
Act (SIRA).1 83 The proposed SIRA legislation implemented a blanket
licensing system for mechanical rights, similar to the system used for
performance rights.1 84 SIRA would have given copyright owners the
ability to elect a "designated agent," which could be one of the PROs
or any other entity that represented at least 15 percent of the music
publishing market. 8 5 The designated agent would be responsible for
maintaining a searchable electronic database of all the musical works
in its repertoire.1 86 The Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) would set the
rates for the mechanical licenses between the various designated
agents and the licensees.1 8 7 While SIRA offered a promising solution
to the song-by-song licensing system for mechanical rights, it was
never enacted. 8 8 After the failure of SIRA, HFA's obligation to
monitor royalty payments on a song-by-song basis became even more
89
challenging with the rise of streaming.'
Title I of the recently enacted MMA offers a solution to this
problem.' 9 0 This portion of the act, known as the Music Licensing
Modernization Act, modified § 115 of the Copyright Act "to establish a
new blanket license for digital music providers to engage in specific
covered activities (namely, permanent downloads, limited downloads,
and interactive streaming)."' 9 ' Under the amended § 115(d)(3), the
Register of Copyrights must designate a mechanical licensing
92
collective to administer a blanket license for mechanical rights.1
The collective is also obligated to create a database of musical works
93
Ultimately, the Music Licensing
and sound recordings.s
Modernization Act replaces the burdensome song-by-song licensing
process with a more efficient blanket licensing system akin to the
94
system for licensing public performance rights for musical works.1

providers found [the song-by-song licensing of mechanical rights] difficult and
expensive to administer, and music publishers and songwriters believed that providers
often did not obtain valid licenses or pay required royalties.").
183. MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 31.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 21.
190. See Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, supra note
179.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. Id.
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B. Sound-Recordings Licensing
Streaming services must also obtain licenses for the soundrecording copyrights, which are attached to the songs they perform,
reproduce, and distribute.1 95 Neither mechanical nor public
performance licensing deals for sound recordings are subject to
government oversight for digital interactive streaming services. 196
Digital interactive streaming services include on-demand music
consumption platforms, like Spotify and YouTube, which allow users
to select specific songs.' 97 Meanwhile, public performance and
mechanical rights for digital noninteractive services are subject to
compulsory licensing fees set by the CRB under §§ 112 and 114 of the
Copyright Act.19 8 By definition, digital noninteractive music services
do not give a listener control over the particular song that plays, and
include platforms like Pandora and satellite-radio companies like
Sirius XM.199 Thus, a streaming service's status as either an
interactive or noninteractive platform determines whether its soundrecording licensing arrangements are subjected to government
oversight.
Under §§ 112 and 114 of the Copyright Act, noninteractive music
services are subject to compulsory public performance licensing fees
set by the CRB. 20 0 These services make the royalty payments to a
nonprofit entity called SoundExchange. 20 1 Section 114 requires that
50 percent of the royalty stream goes to the copyright owner, 45
percent goes to the featured recording artist, and 2.5 percent goes to
an agent representing nonfeatured vocalists. 20 2 Interestingly, the
allocation of royalty payments does not allot an amount to the
producer of the sound recording. Thus, the producer is responsible for
contracting for a portion of these royalties through an agreement with
the featured artist or the copyright owner, typically the record
label.2

03

195. See MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 43.
196. See id.
197. See 17 U.S.C. § 114()(7) (2018) (defining interactive service as one that
allows someone to receive "a transmission of a program specifically created for the
recipient," or "a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part of
a program, which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient").
198. MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 46; see Licensing 101,
SOUNDEXCHANGE, https://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/licensing-101/

(last visited Feb. 17, 2019) [https://perma.cc/PX3Z-WPLJ] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
199.

See MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 48. Pandora may in

fact fall within the statutory definition of "interactive digital service" because it creates
playlists based on user music preferences. One open question is whether this type of
service offers a program that is "specially created for the recipient" such that it would
qualify as an active service under the statute. Id.
200. See id. at 46.
201. Id. at 47.
202.

Id.

203.

See id. at 47-48.
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Section 112, 114, and 115 licenses are subject to rates set by the
CRB. 204 The CRB has a per-performance rate for internet radio, as
20 5
opposed to a percentage-of-revenue rate typically used by PROs.
However, Congress gave SoundExchange the authority to negotiate
its own rates in place of those set by the CRB. 2 06 SoundExchange has
since negotiated rates with internet-radio services, which pay
approximately 25 percent of gross revenues in royalty fees. 207
C. Discount Licenses
Despite the newly improved music-licensing framework, the
DMCA still provides an option for YouTube and similar user upload
service providers to obtain "discount licenses." 208 As previously
discussed, the DMCA's safe harbors allow these service providers to
20 9
offer unauthorized content without the threat of incurring liability.

This safety net is a powerful bargaining chip during licensing
negotiations with music rightsholders. For example, when YouTube
negotiates with a rightsholder to secure music licenses, it has the
ability to "demand bargain basement terms by threatening to relegate
copyright owners to the futility of the notice and takedown
process." 2 10 This practice affects legitimate licensing deals because it
2 11
For
creates an inevitable "race to the bottom for all licenses."
instance, an RIAA analysis demonstrates that rightsholders receive
approximately $7 for every one thousand streams on Spotify, while
these same rightsholders receive only $1 from service providers
employing the liability-shielding safe harbors contained in the DMCA
and other reciprocal statutes. 212 A March 2017 report by the Phoenix
Study shows that this practice results in lost revenues of between
$650 million and over $1 billion for the US music industry every
year. 213 This significant revenue loss driven by YouTube's discount
licenses underscores the urgent need for a solution to the value gap.

204.
205.
206.
207.

See id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
See id.
See id. at 52.

208. See ALDEN ABBOTT, ET AL., REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY PROJECT:
INTELLECTUAL PROP. WORKING GRP., CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION UNCHAINED: WHY
COPYRIGHT LAW MUST BE UPDATED FOR THE DIGITAL AGE BY SIMPLIFYING IT 15 (2017),

https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/RTP-Intellectual-Property-Working-GroupPaper-Copyright.pdf [https://perma.cclS228-YCCD](archived Feb. 4, 2019).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 15-16.
213. Id. at 16.
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The 2018 Global Music Report recognizes the value gap as a
significant policy issue facing the music industry and states that
"legislative action is needed" to prevent user upload streaming
services like YouTube from "free riding on the back of so called 'safe
harbor' liability privileges." 214 While this report points out the need
for legislative action, it does not make any specific recommendations.
The following subparts discuss potential legislative and judicial
solutions to the value gap.
A. JudicialAction
Although many of the proposed solutions to the value gap involve
legislative action in some form or another, it is worth first considering
the courts' potential role in solving the problem. YouTube's music
distribution and promotion capacities are akin to digital interactive
streaming services such as Spotify. 215 The relevant difference
between these services is that YouTube passively monitors the
content uploaded by users of its site, while Spotify actively performs
and distributes songs on its platform. Under the DMCA, a service
provider that "receives a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity" which it has "the right and ability to control" falls
outside the ambit of the safe harbor provision. 216 The Second Circuit
in Viacom explained that YouTube's relatively passive involvement in
the streaming process shielded the company from liability under the
safe harbor provisions.2 17 There, the court made clear that the
"ability to remove or block access to materials posted on a service
provider's website" does not constitute "control" as contemplated by §
512(c)(1)(B). 218 Ultimately, the court held that control of the
infringing activity required "something more," but failed to expand
upon what kind of conduct falls within this category. 219 The Viacom
court merely suggested in dicta that inducement of copyright
infringement, like that in Grokster, may be the kind of control that
would disqualify a service provider from safe harbor protection. 220
The more recent Ninth Circuit holding in Fung has provided
some clarification as to the type of control that makes a user upload
service provider ineligible for protection under the safe harbor

214. 2018 GLOBAL MUSIc REPORT, supra note 16, at 26.
215. See Roberts, supra note 27.
216. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2010).
217. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19, 38 (2d Cir. 2012).
218. Id. (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627,
645 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
219. Alderman, supra note 67.
220. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005)).
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provisions.2 2 1 In Fung, the defendant's decision to organize files on
his peer-to-peer file sharing websites in a manner that pointed users
toward infringing content, coupled with its history of directly guiding
users to such content, disqualified it from the benefits of the safe
harbor provision. 222
In applying these holdings to YouTube's current conduct, a court
would probably find that YouTube receives a financial benefit from
infringing content. 223 Like the ad-supported service provider in Fung,
YouTube's revenue comes from advertising. 2 24 Thus, its revenue is
similarly "predicated on the broad availability of infringing
materials." 22 5 Furthermore, YouTube Music Premium is a
subscription-based feature that provides yet another direct financial
benefit derived from the infringing content available on the site. 226
The more difficult question is whether YouTube exerts control
over the infringing content sufficient to disqualify it from safe harbor
protection. YouTube's level of control over the musical content on its
site has increased considerably since the 2012 Viacom decision. 227
Perhaps a court revisiting the issue of control in light of the
company's current activities would find that YouTube's conduct
constitutes "something more" than merely removing and blocking
access to materials.2 2 8 For instance, YouTube's recent 2018
implementation of Official Artist Channels creates a central location
for users to find all content by a specific artist or band. 22 9 These
consolidated channels make it easier for music consumers to treat
YouTube like a free jukebox.2 3 0 Further, as of 2015, YouTube's video
recommendation system accounted for over half of the videos viewed
from its homepage.23 1 Arguably, YouTube is like the defendant in
Fung in that it exerts a great deal of influence over the infringing
content viewed on its site.2 32
Unfortunately, there is no way to be certain that a future court
revisiting the issue in Viacom would find that YouTube's present
practices satisfy the vague "control" requirement as contemplated by

221. Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1044-46 (9th Cir. 2013).
222. Id. at 1046.
223. See id. at 1044-46.
224. Id. at 1045; see Paine, supra note 29.
225. Fung, 710 F.3d at 1045.
226. See id. at 1044; Katzowitz, supranote 31.
227. See, e.g., Katzowitz, supra note 31; Stutz, supra note 33; TROUVUS, supra
note 37.
228. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19, 38 (2d Cir. 2012).
229. Stutz, supranote 33.
230. See Fingas, supra note 35.
231. TROUVUS, supra note 37.
232. See Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1045 (9th Cir. 2013)
(finding control under the DMCA in part because the defendant organized content on
its site in such a manner that assisted users in finding infringing content).
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§ 512(c)(1)(B).2 33 Even if a court adopted the view that the
defendants' conduct in Grokster and Fung represents the type of
control prohibited by the safe harbors, it is unlikely that the court
will find a similar level of control with respect to YouTube's more
passive activities. 234 After all, 90 percent or more of the defendants'
peer uploaded content in Grokster and Fung was found to be
infringing. 235 This is not the case for the musical content uploaded on
YouTube. 236 In addition, the defendants in both Grokster and Fung
made affirmative statements encouraging users to view infringing
content on their sites. Even though YouTube has become more
actively involved with the organization and presentation of its
content, a court today would probably fail to find that the site's
additional control since the holding in Viacom places the company
outside the safe harbor.2 37
There are also several practical and administrative problems
with a judicial solution to the value gap. First, there is no guarantee
that courts across the world would consistently find that YouTube's
recent activities place it outside the scope of safe harbor protections
contained in the wide range of DMCA-like statutes in other countries.
Further, a judicial solution to the value gap would be implemented
gradually across each jurisdiction because the question of control will
only be evaluated as lawsuits arise. Moreover, a judicial solution will
also require courts to evaluate whether other peer upload sites exert
the requisite control over infringing content. Finally, a judicially
implemented solution to the value gap is impractical because it would
require courts around the world to individually analyze the control
issue in future cases involving user upload streaming sites that have
not yet been developed.
B. Opt-Out Provisionfor Licensing Musical Works
The U.S. Copyright Office's 2015 Copyright and the Music
Marketplace Report (Music Marketplace Report) discusses potential
solutions related to music licensing that would have an immediate
impact on the value gap.2 38 The Music Marketplace Report suggests
that a complete overhaul of the current licensing system may be the
ideal way to solve the issue, but points out that "as tempting as it
may be to daydream about a new model built from scratch, such a
233. See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38.
234. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005);
Fung, 710 F.3d at 1044-46; Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38.
235. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919; Fung, 710 F.3d at 1045.
236. See Andrew Flanagan, Google Points New Piracy Report Towards the Music
Industry, BILLBOARD (July 13, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/
7438151/google-piracy-report-youtube-music-industry-reacts
[https://perma.cclL3TYGJWJ] (archived Jan. 27, 2019).
237. See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38.
238.

See MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 133-37.
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course would seem to be logistically and politically unrealistic."23 9
Instead, it advocates for a correction of the current system "from the
material we have on hand." 24 0 In other words, the solution should
involve existing facets of the licensing scheme such as compulsory
licensing. 24 1
The U.S. Copyright Office points out that these goals can be
achieved through equal treatment for the use of sound recordings and
musical works whenever possible. 242 Presently, digital interactive
licenses with
sound-recording
negotiate
services
streaming
rightsholders in the free market. 243 Meanwhile, these same
streaming services license the performance and mechanical rights for
24 4
musical works according to statutory rates set by the government.
This system has left many songwriters and publishers disgruntled by
the fact that record companies .are able to negotiate their own terms
and consequently command higher licensing rates. 24 5 The Music
Marketplace Report proposes implementing an opt-out right that
allows musical works copyright owners to elect to negotiate license
agreements in the free market.2 4 6 If parties fail to come to an
agreement, they can fall back on the rates set by the government.2 4 7
Given the relatively equal importance of a song's composition and the
physical recording of that composition (i.e., a consumer cannot enjoy
one without the other), this proposed solution seeks to promote
"equitable rates as between sound recordings and musical works." 248
The Music Marketplace Report clarifies that this solution does not
guarantee equality of rates, but at least "encourage[s] evenhanded
consideration of both rates by a single body, under a common
24 9
standard, to achieve a fair result."
C. Expansion of Compulsory Licensing to DigitalInteractive
Streaming Services
Compulsory licenses under §§ 112 and 114 of the Copyright Act
have been effective in compensating rightsholders, especially within
the digital-streaming sphere. 250 SoundExchange is responsible for
239. Id. at 133.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 135-36, 169.
242. Id. at 135.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 136. (acknowledging that "[alt least some disparity appears to
arise from publishers' inability to negotiate free from government constraint where
record companies can").
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 137.
250. Id. at 175.
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administering
these
compulsory licenses
to noninteractive
platforms. 25 1 Given the success of this framework, a logical
consideration would be to extend compulsory licensing to cover digital
interactive streaming services such as YouTube. 25 2 SoundExchange
has a particularly good reputation among rightsholders and licensees
alike because it successfully identifies the owners of unmatched
sound recordings and divvies out royalties according to a prescribed
statutory formula.253

The Music Marketplace Report points out that some independent
artists and labels lack negotiating power and prefer the compulsory
license framework set forth under §§ 112 and 114.254 Some that fall
within'this category support the expansion of the compulsory license
system from solely noninteractive digital services to interactive ones
as well. 25 5 However, the Music Marketplace Report ultimately rejects
this recommendation because the U.S. Copyright Office does not
believe that large record labels would be willing to give up their
current freedom to negotiate their own terms. 25 6 The Music
Marketplace Report also justifies its rejection of this option because it
fails to recognize any issues with the functioning of the current
system for licensing sound recordings. 2 57 Still, others have
commented on the drawbacks of this kind of compulsory licensing
scheme. 2 58 One need look no further than well-known noninteractive
online radio services like Pandora to recognize that the framework
has not exactly worked flawlessly.2 5 9 James H. Richardson, alumnus

of the UCLA School of Law, opines that the rates paid by Pandora
under the compulsory licensing framework "verge on punitive." 260
Richardson reasons that under the current compulsory licensing
framework, Pandora is required to pay a "substantial share of its
revenue to owners of sound recordings."2

251. Id.
252. Cf. id. (explaining that the framework set forth in these provisions "is
generally well regarded").
253. See id.
254. Id. at 176.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 177.
257. Id.
258. See James H. Richardson, Create a Compulsory License Scheme for OnDemand Digital Media Platforms, 31 ENT. & SPORTS L. 9, 10 (2014) (arguing that the
current compulsory licensing scheme encumbers internet radio providers with
exorbitant royalty fees, and render their business unprofitable).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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SOLUTION

This Note proposes a solution to the value gap that involves
concerted legislative effort in a two-step approach. First,
policymakers must engage in legislative reform of the safe harbor
provisions contained in outdated laws like the DMCA. A revision of
Article 8 of the WCT could compel treaty signatories to comply by
narrowing the application of their domestic safe harbor statutes. 262
This revision should be designed to instruct WCT parties to amend
their safe harbor statutes in a manner that eliminates the presently
available liability privileges for large-scale user upload musicstreaming services such as YouTube. Once removed from the safe
harbors, the displaced service providers will be unable to leverage
these privileges in negotiating discounted licensing deals. 26 3 The
second step of the legislative reform calls on domestic lawmaking
bodies to amend current licensing schemes to better suit the interests
of various stakeholders involved in music-licensing transactions.
A. Revision of Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty
On May 5, 2016, the CEO of the IFPI, Frances Moore, issued a
statement in which she advocated for legislative reform of safe harbor
provisions. 26 4 Moore opined, "[t]he value gap is not something our
business can fix. It is a legislative issue caused by the misapplication
26 5
of the so-called liability 'safe harbors' to user upload services."
Moore went on to clarify that the proposed legislative action is not "a
campaign to sweep away safe harbors altogether." 266 She
acknowledged that the safe harbor provisions continue to adequately
"protect passive, neutral intermediaries that do not select, organize,
promote and monetize music." 267 However, Moore pointed out that
the application of the safe harbor provisions to services that organize
and monetize the distribution and promotion of music on a large scale

262. See FRANKEL & GERVAIS, supra note 139, at 85-86 (acknowledging that
Article 8 of the WCT provides the international rule that allows countries to enact safe
harbor provisions); WCT Summary, supra note 153.
263. See ABBOTT, supra note 208.
264. See generally, Frances Moore, The value gap-the missing beat at the heart
of our industry, IFPI (May 5, 2016), http://www.ifpi.org/news/The-value-gap-the(archived
[https://perma.cc/4EAA-NNCA]
missing-beat-at-the-heart-of-our-industry
Jan. 27, 2019).
265. Id.; see also 2018 GLOBAL MusIc REPORT, supra note 16, at 25 (stating that
"[1]egislative action is needed to ensure that laws on copyright liability are applied
consistently, so that online user upload content services making music available must
negotiate licenses to do so, instead of free riding on the back of so called 'safe harbour'
liability privileges").
266. Moore, supra note 264.
267. Id.
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does not make sense in light of the legislative purposes of these
statutes. 268
In line with Moore's statement, this Note advocates for a
legislative solution to the value gap that removes safe harbor
protection for streaming services that gain a financial benefit by
exerting a requisite level of control over infringing content. 269 While
the proposed legislative changes outlined below must occur at the
national level, a revision to Article 8 of the WCT would be
instrumental in facilitating these changes to domestic safe harbor
statutes. 2 70 As previously discussed in Part III, the WCT Assembly
has the power to execute the proposed revision to Article 8 under
Article 15 of the treaty.27 1 Article 8 and the accompanying agreed
statement contain the international rule that provides the scope for
countries to enact safe harbor legislation in the first place. 2 72 Thus, a

change to Article 8 that limits this scope will require WCT parties to
enact legislation compliant with their updated treaty obligations. 2 7 3
Perhaps the most straightforward way to restructure safe harbor
protection on the national level is to clarify the control exception
found in § 512(c)(1)(B) of the DMCA and reciprocal clauses in DMCAlike statutes implemented in other countries. 2 74 Section 512(c)(1)(B)
states that a service provider is not entitled to safe harbor protection
if it receives "a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and
ability to control such activity." 2 75 Under Viacom, the meaning of the

control exception has remained somewhat ambiguous. 276 The
language in this clause could be clarified through legislation that
redefines the statutory meaning of the word "control."27 7 Section
512(c)(1)(B) should be altered so that it denies safe harbor protection
for service providers that, like YouTube, "receive a financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case where the
service provider has" the right and ability to control, organize, or
promote such activity.2 7 8
268. Id.
269. See id.
270. FRANKEL & GERVAIS, supra note 139, at 85.
271. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 149, art. 15.
272. FRANKEL & GERVAIS, supra note 139, at 85.
273. Id.; see WCT Summary, supra note 153.
274. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2010)
(service provider is eligible for safe harbor protection if, inter alia, it "does not receive a
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity"); see also Council
Directive 2000/31, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC) explaining that the safe harbors in
the E-Commerce Directive do not apply if the recipient is acting under the authority or
control of the ISSP).
275. DMCA § 512(c)(1)(B).
276. See Alderman, supra note 67; see also Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Fung, 710
F.3d 1020, 1044-46 (9th Cir. 2013).
277. DMCA § 512(c)(1)(B).
278. Id.; see Moore, supra note 264.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

540

[voL. 52:511

revenue
ad-supported and subscription-based
YouTube's
certainly constitutes a "financial benefit directly attributable to
infringing activity."2 7 9 Like the defendant's websites in Fung,
YouTube generates revenue that is largely "predicated on the broad
availability of infringing materials." 28 0 Further, under the proposed
amendment to the statute's control provision, YouTube's carefully
prearranged Official Artist Channels and its highly persuasive and
influential video recommendation system certainly provide the
streaming service with the right and ability to control, organize, or
promote infringing activity. 2 8 ' Ultimately, this tailored change to the
control provision would maintain safe harbor protection for truly
passive user upload sites, while imposing liability on those that
maintain a more active relationship with the unlicensed content
uploaded to their sites.
A revision to Article 8 will require WCT signatories to implement
the change to their respective safe harbor statutes in compliance with
their updated treaty obligations. 2 82 Perhaps the simplest revision to
Article 8 that would accomplish the stated goals would involve
altering the agreed statement concerning Article 8.283 This revision
should retain the portion stating that the that the mere provision of
physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not
284
amount to a violation of the communication right under the treaty.
However, it must establish that a service provider's control,
organization, or promotion of infringing activity does constitute a
violation of the communication right when the provider receives a
financial benefit directly attributable to such activity. 285 Such a
revision to the treaty will compel contracting parties to limit the
scope of their domestic safe harbor statutes in a manner that removes
protection for YouTube and similar large-scale user upload streaming
services.
B. Legislative Changes to the Music-LicensingFramework
If the aforementioned revision to Article 8 of the WTC is
executed, and conforming legislative action is taken by the WCT's one
hundred member states at the national level, user upload streaming
services operating like YouTube will lose safe harbor protection and
will no longer be able to threaten to relegate rightsholders to the
arduous notice and takedown process. 286 The loss of this powerful
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

DMCA § 512(c)(1)(B).
Fung, 710 F.3d at 1045; see Luckerson, supra note 31; Paine, supra note 29.
See Stutz, supra note 33; TROUVUS, supra note 37.
See WCT Summary, supranote 153.
WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 149, art. 8, n.7.
See id.
See id.
See ABBOTT, supra note 208.
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bargaining chip will lead to licensing rates that are more reflective of
the market value.2 8 7 Although YouTube's liability shield under the

safe harbor provisions is arguably the most glaring source of the
value gap, 288 there are other facets of the music-licensing framework
that are problematic and worth addressing. The second step of this
Note's proposed solution involves a relatively minor legislative
adjustment to the current licensing system.
The compulsory licensing scheme for digital noninteractive
services seeking to obtain the right to publicly perform sound
recordings is considered to be a successful method for assuring
adequate royalty payments.2 8 9 In light of this success, the same
scheme should be applied to interactive streaming services as well. 29 0
If this change were made, SoundExchange would be the obvious
candidate for administering the licenses to interactive platforms
because it is already responsible for administering them to
noninteractive services. 2 91 Further, SoundExchange has garnered a
favorable reputation, stemming from its ability to identify the owners
of unmatched sound recordings and efficiently distribute royalties
through the use of its prescribed statutory formula. 292 Finally,
importing a compulsory licensing framework into the digital
interactive services sphere would help combat unfair negotiations
between large licensees and independent rightsholders with little
negotiating leverage. 29 3
The Music Marketplace Report rejects this option because,
although it is supported by independent rightsholders, many large
record labels would prefer to negotiate directly with licensees in the
free market. 2 94 Given the concerns of larger labels, policymakers
should consider implementing an opt-out provision through which
rightsholders may choose to remove themselves from the compulsory
licensing scheme in favor of free-market negotiations. 2 95 This
compromise is akin to the opt-out provision suggested by the Music
Marketplace Report in the context of licensing musical works. 296 If a
major label believes it can negotiate a better deal, it can opt-out of the
compulsory licensing scheme, without forcing independent labels to
fend for themselves in licensing negotiations with YouTube, Spotify,
and other behemoth licensees.
287. See id.
288. See Singleton & Popper, supra note 12.
289. MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 175.
290. Id.
291. See id.
292. Id.
293. See id. at 176 (observing that some independent artists and labels lack
negotiating power and thus would prefer the compulsory license framework set forth
under sections 112 and 114 in the digital interactive streaming sphere).
294. Id. at 177.
295. Cf. id. at 136 (suggesting an opt-out provision in the context of musical work
performance rights licensing).
296. See id.
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Still, others object to the compulsory licensing model for
interactive digital services because the current rates set for
noninteractive services represent too great of a percentage of some
licensees' overall revenue.2 97 Individuals opposed to compulsory
licensing on these grounds overlook the possibility of basing the
compulsory rate on a percentage of revenue. This percentage-ofrevenue rate should seem familiar because it is already employed in
blanket licensing deals for public performance rights.29 8 The rate can
be readily implemented because Congress has already given
SoundExchange the authority to negotiate its own rates in place of
those set by the CRB. 2 99 A change such as this addresses the concerns
voiced by those like James Richardson who believe that the rates paid
by noninteractive services under the current compulsory licensing
framework "verge on punitive."3 00 Ultimately, this relatively
straightforward change to the music-licensing framework coupled
with the change to Article 8 of the WCT would likely serve as a solid
stepping-stone toward greatly reducing the remuneration problems
associated with the music industry's value gap.

VII. CONCLUSION

The value gap is perhaps the largest problem facing the
sustainability of the global music industry. The safe harbor
provisions in the DMCA and other similar laws across the globe
contribute greatly to the expansion of the value gap. The
remuneration issues arising out of these statutes have in some cases
discouraged would-be songwriters and artists from pursuing careers
in music. Further, the statutes have allowed streaming services like
YouTube to exploit music on an international scale without the risk of
incurring copyright-infringement liability. Finally, the statutes'
arduous notice and takedown requirements place a weighty burden
on parties seeking to enforce their copyrights. While courts could
correct this problem, inconsistency in rulings across borders coupled
with the gradual adoption of such rulings would make judicial
revision of the DMCA-like laws an impractical solution to this urgent
music industry crisis.
Instead, this Note has proposed a legislative solution to the value
gap that involves a two-step approach. First, it calls on the WCT
assembly to revise Article 8 and its accompanying agreed statement
in a manner that prevents contracting parties from providing safe
harbor protection to streaming services that control, organize,
297.
298.
299.
300.

See Richardson, supranote 258.
MUSIC MARKETPLACE REPORT, supra note 161, at 33.
See id. at 51.
Richardson, supra note 258.
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promote, and monetize the music on their sites. Once contracting
parties amend their safe harbor statutes in compliance with this
revision, streaming sites like YouTube will lose their unfair leverage
in licensing negotiations. The second step of this Note's legislative
solution recommends changes to the music-licensing system to ensure
efficient and equitable licensing deals. It implements a compulsory
licensing requirement (with an opt-out provision) for digital
interactive streaming services. If adopted, the recommendations in
this Note will help ensure the stability and sustainability of the
global music industry in the age of digital music streaming.
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